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HOLDING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES: A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES Acr OF 1976
I. INTRODUCTION

As history marches ever onward, there is a hope-indeed a
belief-that mankind is on an inexorable journey to higher and
higher moral plateaus. To be disabused of this notion, though, one
need only note that some of the greatest atrocities in all of human
history-for example, the holocaust, the killing fields of
Cambodia-have been committed in the twentieth century.
Today, even as this century comes to a close, human rights abuses
are rampant throughout the world.
But what can be done to stop these abuses? Many solutions
have been offered. Some have advocated that the United Nations
wage an all out war against the offending regimes in a new world
order. Others have suggested less drastic means such as mobilizing
world opinion against those regimes through social, political, and
economic isolation. This Comment examines one narrow solution
that would punish offending governments and their leaders in a
manner that would perhaps inflict the most pain-i.e., financially,
through suits for damages brought in United States courts.
Suits for damages, however, are presently limited by
legislation, case law, and prudential doctrines of U.S. courts. For
example, today a victim can bring suit in U.S. courts for human
rights abuses suffered abroad under the Alien Tort Claims Act. 1
But when the defendant is a government or foreign leader, that
evaporates and the victim is left without any
jurisdiction quickly
2
legal remedy.
Because many human rights abuses are committed by foreign
governments or their leaders, a cohesive structure of law that
would subject foreign sovereigns to suit for their human rights
abuses is badly needed. Some of the essential elements are
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
2. This is basically a result of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the case law
following from it. See discussion infra Parts III and IV.
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already in place. Nevertheless, the crucial obstacle that inevitably
frustrates any attempt to hold abusive regimes accountable is the
doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, which endows these actors
with immunity from suit.
Advocates have suggested several ways of reaching foreign
sovereigns in court. For example, some have urged the courts to
widen their jus cogens3 jurisprudence to include human rights
abuses by holding that a sovereign implicitly waives its immunity
whenever it engages in human rights violations. 4 Others have
suggested a legislative approach, proposing various pieces of
legislation amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to
include human rights abuses. 5 The question that has to be raised,
however, is whether such a proposed legislative amendment would
be consistent with the doctrinal underpinnings of the Act.
Part II begins by setting forth the theoretical foundations of
foreign sovereign immunity and its historical development. Part
III examines the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,6 and
related laws and judicial doctrines. Part IV analyzes cases decided
under or impacted by this jurisprudence. With the stage thus set,
Part V recommends that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act be
amended to cover human rights abuses. Part VI argues that
Congress has the authority to pass such an amendment, and that
the courts could constitutionally uphold and enforce it.
This Comment concludes that the proposed legislative
amendment would justifiably fit within the doctrinal underpinnings
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. It would withstand
constitutional scrutiny, and thus our courts could render judgments
against foreign regimes under it. While human nature may not, in
the end, be evolving to ever higher moral plateaus, perhaps our
jurisprudence can.

3. As defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a jus cogens norm
"is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as
a norm from which no derogation is permitted .... " Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 382,8 I.L.M. 679.
4. Others argue, however, that this might not be effective. See David J. Bederman,
Dead Man's Hand: Reshuffling Foreign Sovereign Immunities in U.S. Human Rights
Litigation, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 255,278 (1996).
5. See Bederman, supra note 4, at 282-83; see also Carolyn J. Brock, The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act: Defining a Role for the Executive, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 795, 820
(1990).
6. The measure is codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391(f), 1441(d), and 1602-11
(1997).
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II.

THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

A. Purpose
The concept of sovereign immunity derived from the ancient7
maxim rex not potest peccarre (i.e., The King can do no wrong.).
As between nations, a complimentary notion arose: par not habet
in parem
imperium (i.e., An equal has no authority over an
8
equal.).
Simply put, the purpose of the doctrine of sovereign immunity
was and is to avoid friction between nations in the resolution of
their disputes. 9 From this simple premise, a large doctrinal body
of law has developed over time.
B. HistoricalDevelopment
One of the earliest U.S. cases involving foreign sovereign
immunity involved an admiralty claim against the French
government in 1812.10 Two American citizens arrested a vessel in
Napoleon's navy, claiming the vessel had been wrongfully taken
from them by the French. 11 The court ruled that there could be no
claim against the French government because it was a sovereign
nation.1 2 As late as 1926, the U. S. Supreme Court continued to
apply sovereign immunity principles to foreign state-owned
vessels. 13
As the doctrine evolved further, it became based on notions
of comity and customary public international law.14 A distinction,
however, began to develop between causes of action arising out of
a foreign state's governmental acts ('us imperii) and its commercial
acts (jus gestionis).15 Although, a nation's governmental acts were
protected, its commercial acts were exempt from this immunity.
This was the beginning of the "restrictive" theory of sovereign

7. See William R. Dorsey, Reflections on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act After
Twenty Years, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 257,257 (1997).
8. See Brock, supra note 5, at 796-97.
9. See Dorsey, supra note 7, at 257.
10. See Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
11. See id. at 121.
12- See id at 144, 147.
13. See Dorsey, supra note 7, at 258 (citing Berizzi Brothers Co. v. Steamship Pesaro,
271 U.S. 562, 562,576 (1926)).
14. See Dorsey, supra note 7, at 257.
15. Seeidat258.
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16

immunity.
In 1926, the International Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to the Immunity of State-Owned Vessels
incorporated such a restrictive theory. 17 From its inception
through the mid-1900s, the idea that immunity vanishes when a
government acts as a market participant or as a private party
prevailed. In 1958, the notion that state-owned commercial vessels
were not entitled to immunity was incorporated into the Geneva
Convention of the High Seas and the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. 18 By 1976 most nations
and it
had adopted some form of restrictive sovereign immunity 19
law."
international
of
rule
the
be
to
conceded
was "generally
In the United States, application of foreign sovereign
immunity has had an interesting history. In 1943, the Supreme
Court ruled that U.S. courts would defer to decisions of the
Executive Branch and the Department of State. 20 Further, until
1952 the State Department customarily requested that the courts
to a foreign sovereign in any action
grant absolute immunity
21
brought against it.
In 1952, however, the State Department modified its position
and announced that immunity would only apply to suits that arose
from a foreign government's public acts. 22 This shift in policy,
referred to as the "Tate Letter," left foreign governments exposed
to suit for their private or commercial acts.23 The Tate Letter
sovereign immunity
stated that "the prior absolute rule of foreign
24
was simply not consistent with modern law."
Unfortunately, this politicized the determination of sovereign
immunity. Because the Tate Letter was not binding on the State
Department, diplomatic pressures could, and often did, influence
16. The doctrine is considered to be "restrictive" because it does not extend to cases
involving commercial or private acts.
17. See Dorsey, supra note 7, at 258.
18. See id. at 258 (citing the Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 9, and
the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 21).
19. Dorsey, supra note 7, at 259.
20. See Ex ParteRepublic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943); see also Dorsey, supra note 7,
at 259.
21. See Dorsey, supra note 7, at 259.
22. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to
Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T OF
STATE BULL. 984-85 (1952).
23. See id.
24. Dorsey, supra note 7, at 259.
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its decisions. 25
Whenever the State Department filed a
recommendation of immunity on behalf of a foreign state, or
conversely, if it failed to intercede on behalf of a foreign state, the
courts considered it determinative. 26 If the State Department
recommended immunity, then the claim was merely shifted to the
diplomatic arena for resolution, a forum generally considered to
be ill-suited for this purpose. 27 This continued to be the case until
Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in 1976.28
C. Problems In Enforcement/Application
Implementation of the Tate Letter was problematic inasmuch
the State Department forum was ill-suited for the purpose of
resolving legal disputes. A private litigant could never be certain
whether legal or political considerations would control a State
Department decision. The ad hoc process led to inconsistent
results and placed undue pressure on the State Department to
intervene in favor of defendant foreign states.29 There were other
problems as well. There were no specific procedures for effecting
service on foreign sovereigns (litigants were forced to seize and
attach property of foreign sovereigns); seizures could not be used
to execute any judgments, absent waiver or consent, because
sovereign property was immune; seizures created friction with
foreign governments; and most other countries considered
a
sovereign immunity to be not a diplomatic issue, but rather
30
matter of international law, best determined by their courts.
III. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT

A. Passageof the ForeignSovereign Immunities Act of 1976
In response to these problems, Congress enacted the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). It embodied the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity as set forth in the Tate Letter.
Introduced in January 1973, it was signed into law on October 21,
25. See id.
26. See Brock, supra note 5, at 802.
27. See id at 260 (citing Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States,
Hearingson H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. of Admin. Law and Governmental Relations
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,94th Cong. 32 (1976)).
2& See id. at 802-03.
29. See id. at 818.
30. See Dorsey, supra note 7, at 260-61.

190
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1976.
B. Purposesof the Act
The purpose of the FSIA was four-fold. 31 First, the Act
sought to uphold the general principle of sovereign immunity,
32
while codifying the restrictive principle of sovereign immunity.
Second, the Act sought to take the question of immunity out of the
hands of the State Department and vest its resolution in the
courts. 33 Third, the Act established a statutory procedure for
effecting service upon and obtaining in personam jurisdiction over
a foreign state.34 Finally, the Act provided for execution of
judgments against foreign sovereigns, i.e., it harmonized rules
governing jurisdiction with those governing attachment and
35
execution.
C. Structure and Descriptionof the Act
The FSIA consists of ten sections and works in conjunction
with accompanying jurisdictional provisions. 36 By far, the most
important provisions of the Act are section 1605, which lists the
general exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign
state, 37 and section 1330, which gives the U.S. district courts
original jurisdiction over these claims. 38 Other sections deal with
findings and declaration of purpose,39 definitions, 40 immunity of a
42
foreign state from jurisdiction, 41 extent of liability,
31. See id at 261.
32. See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7-8 (1976)).
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11, and 28 U.S.C § 1330 (1997).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1997).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1997).
39. Section 1602 states the findings by Congress that the determination of immunity
by the courts would best "serve the interests of justice and would protect the rights of both
foreign states and litigants in United States courts." This section excludes a country's
commercial activities from such immunity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1997).
40. Section 1603 sets forth the definitions of a foreign state, an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state, the territory of the United States, and commercial
activities. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1997).
41. Section 1604 stipulates that a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction
of U.S. courts except as provided in sections 1605 through 1607. Such immunity is also
subject to then-existing international agreements in force at the time of the passage of the
Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1997).
42. Section 1606 establishes that when a foreign state is not entitled to immunity, the
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counterclaims, 43 service and time to answer default, 44 immunity
45
from attachment and execution of property of a foreign state, 46
exceptions to the immunity from attachment 47of execution,
48
certain types of property immune from execution, and venue.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1605: General Exceptions to the Jurisdictional
Immunity of a Foreign State
The most important section of the Act is section 1605, which
enumerates the recognized exceptions to the doctrine of foreign
sovereign immunity and includes the recently enacted antiterrorism provision.
Most notably, like the anti-terrorism
amendment, a parallel provision creating a new exception for
human rights abuses could be placed in this section.
There are currently nine 49 recognized and codified exceptions
to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state: (1) when the
foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by
implication; 50 (2) when the action is based upon or connected with

foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1997).
43. Section 1607 merely exempts any counterclaim from immunity if such a claim
would not have been entitled to immunity if brought as a separate action. See 28 U.S.C. §
1607 (1997).
44. Section 1608 sets forth some of the procedural aspects of the Act. See 28 U.S.C. §
1608 (1997).
45. Section 1609 exempts the property in the United States of a foreign state, subject
to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party, from
attachment, arrest and execution except as provided in sections 1610 and 1611 of the Act.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (1997).
46. Section 1610 operates in conjunction with section 1609 to modify the immunity
from attachment or execution. Notably, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, adds a new exception to immunity, providing that the property of a foreign
state which is liable under the new section 1605(a)(7) is not immune from execution. See
28 U.S.C. § 1610 (1997).
47. Section 1611 operates in conjunction with section 1609 to define the types of
property immune from execution. See 28 U.S.C. § 1611 (1997).
48. Section 1391(0 provides that venue lies in the U.S. district court in the judicial
district: (1) where the events giving rise to the case occurred or where the property
subject to suit is located; (2) where the foreign state's vessel or cargo is located in a
maritime lien case; (3) where the foreign state's agency or instrumentality is either
licensed to do business or is doing business; and (4) in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia in cases against a foreign state or its political subdivisions. See 28
U.S.C. § 1391(f) (1997). A right of removal from state courts is provided, and trials against
foreign states in federal court are non-jury. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1441(d) (1997).
49. The first seven of these are contained in section 1605(a); the remaining two are
codified in section 1505 (b) and (d).
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1997).
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a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state;51 (3) when property is taken in violation of
international law and that property is situated in the United
States; 52 (4) when rights in property situated in the United States
are at issue; 53 (5) when money damages are sought against a
foreign state for personal injury or death, or for damage or loss of
property caused by the tortious act or omission of a foreign state
or of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting
within the scope of his office or employment; 54 (6) when seeking
enforcement of an agreement by a foreign state to submit to
arbitration or to confirm an award made pursuant to such an
arbitration; 55 (7) when money damages are sought against a
foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act
of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking,
or the provision of material support or resources, if such acts were
committed by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state,
while acting within the scope of their office, employment, or
agency; 56 (8) when enforcing a maritime lien against a vessel or
cargo of the foreign state;57 and (9) when foreclosing a preferred
mortgage, as defined in the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920.58
The seventh exception is the new anti-terrorism amendment.
It applies only to those states so designated as a state sponsor of
terrorism under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of
1979 or section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 59 This
limits the applicability of this exception to only those "rogue"
nations. As will be seen, a parallel provision to designate "rogue"
states would also be a part of a proposed human rights amendment
to improve the chances of its passage in Congress.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1330: Actions Against Foreign States
Section 1330 gives federal district courts original jurisdiction
over any non-jury civil action against a foreign state in which the

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1997).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1997).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(4) (1997).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1997).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) (1997).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (1997). This is the new anti-terrorism amendment.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b) (1997).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(d) (1997).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(A) (1997).
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foreign state is not entitled to immunity (under either sections
1605-07 of this Act or under any applicable international
agreement). 60 This section also gives the district courts personal
jurisdiction over foreign states for every claim for relief in which
these courts have original jurisdiction (pursuant to section 1330(a)
where service has been made under section 1608).61
Sections 1604 and 1330(a) work together in this way. Section
1604 prevents federal and state courts from exercising jurisdiction
when a foreign state is entitled to immunity, while section 1330(a)
and
confers jurisdiction on district courts in suits by U.S. citizens
62
by aliens when a foreign state is not entitled to immunity.
[The] key to understanding the structure and scope of the FSIA
is to realize that it is a self-contained long-arm statute. Under §
1330, personal jurisdiction is established if there is subject
matter jurisdiction and proper service of the suit is made under
§ 1608 .... In other words, personal jurisdiction is based on
Subject matter
service and subject matter jurisdiction.
jurisdiction, as discussed above, is in turn based on those
foreign state is not
situations defined in the Act in which the 63
immune from action in United States courts.
D. Related Laws and Doctrines
1. Act of State (State Action) Doctrine
The Act of State doctrine is closely related to the concept of
sovereign immunity and developed during the same period of
history. It is a prudential doctrine of the federal courts, 64 and
limits these courts, for prudential rather than jurisdictional
reasons, from "inquiring into the validity of a foreign nation's
public acts committed within its own territory." 65 The policies
underlying the doctrine are "international comity, respect for the
sovereignty of foreign nations on their own territory, and the
avoidance of embarrassment to the Executive Branch in its

60. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1997).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1997).
62- See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434
(1989).
63. Dorsey, supra note 7, at 262.
64. See Bederman, supra note 4,at 258; see also Honduras Aircraft Registry v. Gov't
of Honduras, 119 F.3d 1530, 1537 (1997).
65. HondurasAircraft Registry, 119 F.3d at 1537.
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conduct of foreign relations .
"...-66
The Act of State doctrine
originally developed as a corollary to the doctrine of sovereign
immunity and was intended to provide state officials, when acting
in their official capacity, the same protection from suit afforded to
67
the state.
In Underhill v. Hernandez, the Supreme Court said in dictum,
"[e]very sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not
sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done
within its own territory." 68 This became the "classic American
statement" and the "traditional formulation" of the State Action
69
Doctrine.
Over time, though, the Act of State doctrine changed its focus
from a personal immunity basis to include commercial activities as
well.70 This led to an inconsistency. Courts allowed foreign states
to assert the Act of State Doctrine as a defense in cases involving
clearly commercial activities. 71 This practice prompted the U.S.
Solicitor General to comment that:
To elevate the foreign state's commercial acts to the protected
status of 'acts of state' would frustrate this modem development
[of restrictive sovereign immunity] by permitting sovereign
immunity to reenter through
the back door, under the guise of
72
the act of state doctrine.

The Act of State doctrine continued to expand so much that
in 1992, after the Trajano v. Marcos decision, 73 a concern arose
that if a government act was characterized as "official" and
"public" the Act of State doctrine might be available on the merits
74
to block consideration of a case involving commercial activities.
While the expanded scope of the Act of State doctrine
muddied any distinction between it and the doctrine of sovereign

66. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S.
400,408 (1989).
67. See Dorsey, supra note 7, at 271.
68. See id.
(citing Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250,252 (1897)).
69. See id. at 272 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416
(1964) and Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 691 (1976)).
70. See id.
71. See id. at 273.
72. 1I
73. See Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992).
74. See Bederman, supra note 4, at 264.
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immunity, 75 it has not, however, created a wider definition of
public acts than that used for the FSIA. In every instance where a
defendant in a human rights case has76 raised an Act of State
defense, that defense has been rejected.
2. Alien Tort Claims Act (Alien Tort Statute)
The Alien Tort Claims Act was enacted in 1789 and provides
for federal subject matter jurisdiction over any civil action brought
by an alien in U.S. district courts "for a tort only, committed77 in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
For awhile it was thought that the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA) could provide a way to reach a foreign sovereign in U.S.
courts. As will be shown, however, in the discussion below on the
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess case, that outcome was not
reached. 78 The result was that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act became the "definitive statement of the United States
government in the area of jurisdiction over foreign States; in a
conflict, the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act will trump the
'79
Alien Tort Claims Act."
3. Torture Victims Protection Act
The Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA) was adopted in
1991 and allows suits in federal district courts against individuals
acting under the authority of a foreign nation who commit acts of
torture or extrajudicial killing. 80 The TVPA, however, contains its
own exhaustion requirement. If a case is brought within the
purview of the TVPA, it must be shown that the plaintiffs have
"exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place in which
the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred. '81 This provision
could require cases brought under the TVPA to go through a
preliminary phase in which the defendant would attempt to show
82
that local remedies were available in the country in question.
75. See Dorsey, supra note 7, at 273.
76. See Bederman, supra note 4, at 264.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
78. See discussion infra Part IV.A.5.
79. David S. Bloch, Dangers of Righteousness: Unintended Consequences of Kadic v.
Karadzic, 4 TULSA J.COMP. & INT'L L. 35, 37-38 n.16 (1996). See Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 433,437-39 (1989).
80. See 28 U.S.C. §1350(2) (1994).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1350(2)(b) (1994).
82. See Bederman, supra note 4, at 277.
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This complicates litigation, and indeed forecloses it if the
defendant is able to argue successfully that effective local remedies
do exist in the subject country. This is a "catch 22" because the
plaintiff would not be in U.S. courts if he could have prevailed in
the potentially rigged foreign courts in the first place.
4. 1997 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
Addressing the problem of terrorism, Congress enacted the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act Of 1996.83 This
Act in turn amended section 1605 of the FSIA by adding a new
subsection, i.e., 1605(a)(7), which created a new exception to
foreign sovereign immunity. Under section 1605(a)(7), U.S.
nationals may bring suits against foreign sovereigns for personal
injury resulting from "torture, extrajudicial killing, air sabotage,
hostage taking or the provision of material support or services...
for such an act" if the foreign state is designated as a state sponsor
84
of terrorism.
This amendment to the FSIA followed the original drafting
pattern used in the FSIA, and simply added an additional
exception to the original five exceptions. Although very broad,
this exception has several limitations on its applicability. The
amendment will apply only if the foreign state is designated as a
state sponsor of terrorism under other federal legislation. Even if
a state is so designated, courts will deny hearing a claim if the
claimant or victim was not a national of the United States, or if a
plaintiff cannot show that the offending state was afforded "a
reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim in accordance with
accepted international rules of arbitration. ' 85
IV.

EFFECr OF THE

FSIA ON HUMAN

RIGHTS CASES

A. Important Cases
Since the passage of the FSIA in 1976, several key cases
involving human rights have been decided. The results were
mixed, with courts finding that sovereigns could be reached in
some circumstances but not in others. In the cases where suits
83. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
221, 110 Stat. 1214, 1241 (1996).
84. 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(7) (1997).
85. Md
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were successfully brought, however, the courts had to engage in
theoretical fictions and doctrinal gyrations to reach those results.
In those cases, the courts demonstrated a strong desire to reach
the "correct" result.
86
Several important cases include Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,88
87
Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, Trajanos v. Marcos,
Princz v. Federal90Republic of Germany,89 and Argentine Republic
v. Amerada Hess.
1. Filartigav. Pena-Irala(1980)
In this case, where plaintiffs sued a former police official in
Paraguay for allegedly torturing their son to death, 91 the Alien
Tort Claims Act was "rediscovered" and successfully invoked to
defeat the claim of sovereign immunity. 92 The Second Circuit
stated:
[W]e doubt whether action by a state official in violation of the
Constitution and laws of the Republic of Paraguay, and wholly
unratified by that nation's government, could properly be
characterized as an act of state. Paraguay's renunciation of
torture as a legitimate instrument of state policy, however, does
not strip the tort of its character as an international law
violation, 93if in fact it occurred under color of government
authority.
To justify its holding, in a sleight of hand reminiscent of the
Ex Parte Young stripping doctrine in 14th Amendment
jurisprudence (and basically to achieve an analogous result), 94 the
court had to make a distinction between the two following
contradictory assertions. First, to defeat the Act of State doctrine
it had to hold that the torture carried out by the defendant was not
86. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
87. See Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 1990).
88. See Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992).
89. See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
90. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
91. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
92. See Bederman, supra note 4, at 256.
93. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 889-90 (citations omitted).
94. The stripping doctrine holds that because a state cannot authorize its officials to
act in an unlawful or unconstitutional manner, any state officer who does so is no longer
acting in his official state capacity, and thus the 11th Amendment does not bar suit against
him. That same official, however, is simultaneously considered to be an official of the
state for "state action" purposes of the 14th Amendment. See Ex Parte Young, 200 U.S.
123, 160 (1908); Pennhurst v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 (1984).
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a "public act." Second, to preserve the cause of action under the
Alien Tort Statute (i.e., to vindicate its "international character"),
it had to simultaneously hold that the torture occurred "under the
color of governmental authority" in95 order to maintain the fiction
of attribution to a sovereign power.
2. Chuidianv. PhilippineNational Bank (1990)
In Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, a member of
Philippine President Aquino's Good Government Commission
ordered a letter of credit to be dishonored. The Court had to
decide whether this letter should be honored. 96 The suit was
brought against the Commissioner in his personal capacity, and he
answered that he was immune under the FSIA. The Ninth Circuit
reasoned:
[W]e cannot infer that Congress . . . intended to allow
unrestricted suits against individual foreign officials acting in
their official capacities. Such a result would amount to a
blanket abrogation of foreign sovereign immunity by allowing
litigants to accomplish indirectly what the Act barred them
from doing directly. It would be illogical to conclude that
Congress would have enacted such a sweeping alteration of
existing law implicitly and without comment.9 7
From a human rights standpoint, this case was unfortunate
because it extended the doctrine of state or sovereign immunity to
individuals acting for the state.
3. Trajano v. Marcos (1992)
The distinction between official and personal capacity was
continued in Trajano, which involved an alleged wrongful death by
torture at the hands of the Philippine government. 98 The Ninth
Circuit reiterated its holding in Chuidian that "the FSIA covers a
foreign official acting in an official capacity, but that official is not
entitled to immunity for acts which are not committed in an official
capacity ..... 99 Thus, activities, such as selling personal property
or acts beyond the scope of an official's authority (e.g., doing

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Bederman, supra note 4, at 265.
See Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1102.
See Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 497 (citing Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1106).
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something the sovereign has not empowered the official to do)
would not be granted immunity.
4. Princz v. FederalRepublic of Germany (1994)
In this case, involving Nazi war atrocities, the district court
initially decided the claim favorably for the plaintiff on the basis of
a jus cogens theory of violation of international norms. 100 This
theory argues that international law does not recognize an act that
violates jus cogens as a sovereign act and it would therefore not be
entitled to the immunity afforded by international law. 10 1 But, this
theory was given an "ignominious burial" on appeal before the
District of Columbia Circuit Court. 102 One more creative
approach was defeated by the courts.
5. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess (1989)
Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation filed suit against
Argentina in federal district court in New York for an attack on a
ship during the Falkland Islands war. Amerada Hess argued that
the Alien Tort Statute conferred jurisdiction on the district court.
The district court, however, dismissed the suit on the grounds that
jurisdiction could only be obtained under the FSIA, and that none
10 3
of the exceptions in the Act applied to the case.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that
Congress' enactment of the FSIA was not meant to eliminate
"existing remedies in United States courts for violations of
international law" by foreign states under the Alien Tort Claims
Act. 104 The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the FSIA's
language and legislative history supported the basic idea that the
FSIA governed the immunity of foreign states in federal court. 10 5
It went on to reason, though, that the FSIA's focus on commercial
concerns and Congress' failure to repeal the Alien Tort Statute
indicated Congress' intention "that federal courts continue to

100. See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
101. See Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699,718 (9th Cir. 1992).
102. See Bederman, supra note 4, at 273.
103. See Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp. 73
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
104. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 433
(1989) (citing Appeal of District Court Dismissal by Amerada Hess, Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421,426 (2d Cir. 1987)).
105. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 435.
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exercise jurisdiction over foreign states in suits alleging violations
of international law outside the confines of the FSIA.' 10 6 The
Court of Appeals felt that to construe the FSIA in any other way
to bar the suit "would 'fly in the face' of Congress' intention that
the FSIA be interpreted pursuant to the 'standards recognized
' 10 7
under international law."
The Supreme Court reversed. 108 In its analysis, the Court
noted that the legislative history of the FSIA demonstrated that
Congress did indeed have foreign states' violations of international
law in mind when it passed the FSIA. 10 9 The Court cited section
1605(a)(3), which specifically denies foreign states immunity for
suits "in which rights in property taken in violation of international
law are in issue.... "1 10 The Court reached the conclusion that the
"text and the structure of the FSIA demonstrated Congress'
intention that the FSIA be the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction
over a foreign state in our courts."'
In so ruling, the Supreme Court established that the sole basis
for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign nation in U.S. courts is
through the FSIA. n 2 Personal jurisdiction over the foreign
sovereign, as well as subject matter jurisdiction, exists only when
one of the exceptions to sovereign immunity applies. 113
Thus, if a suit is brought against a foreign sovereign then it is
necessary to bring the case within one of the statutorily-defined
exceptions of the FSIA. n 4 But this is no easy task because in a
typical human rights case, which alleges tortious acts committed in
a foreign country, no exception is readily available." 5

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 443.
109. See Dorsey, supra note 7, at 298.
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1997).
111. Dorsey, supra note 7, at 298 (citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 434). As applied to the facts of the Amerada case, the
Supreme Court ruled, first that the ATCA did not vest federal courts with subject matter
jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns and that only the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
could do so. Second, it held that the narrowly crafted exceptions to the presumptive
immunity of foreign sovereigns were not met in that case. This effectively precluded using
ATCA and the FSIA as well. See Bederman, supra note 4, at 257.
112. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434
(1989).
113. See id. at 435 n.3.
114. See Bederman, supra note 4, at 270.
115. See id. at 270.
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The Court held that immunity applied in cases alleging
violations of international law that did not fall within one of the
Act's exceptions. The Court made it clear that the exceptions
would not be satisfied in any other case where the cause of action
originated in a tortious violation of the customary international
law of human rights. 116 To sum it up, Amerada Hess "foreclosed
117
suits against foreign sovereigns for their human rights abuses."
This was a pivotal case and the Supreme Court's decision was
a major setback for human rights advocates, particularly in the
province of the Alien Tort Statute. 118 Nonetheless, as will be
shown, the Court's decision fortunately showed the way out of this
human rights quandary.
B. The Necessity for Creative LitigationStrategies
The cases above show that novel jurisprudential doctrines had
to be created by judges and litigants to try to achieve the results
they desired. One such line of cases involved instances in which
foreign sovereigns are considered to have no discretion to carry
out illegal acts in this country. In these cases, courts held that
while individual acts could be attributed as "public acts" of a state,
they did not qualify as a "sovereign act" for purposes of granting
immunity for illegal acts carried out in this country. 1 19
In Filartiga, the Second Circuit similarly contrived a
distinction between "public acts" and acts "occurring under the
color of governmental authority" to reach the conclusion it
desired. In Filartiga,the acts occurring abroad had to be defined
as not being public acts, so as to evade the Act of State doctrine,
while simultaneously being considered a sovereign act (against the
law of nations), so as to allow the ATCA to apply. To evade the
FSIA, the court had to rule that the FSIA covered only
commercial acts, thus still allowing violations of international law
to be prosecuted under the ATCA.
In Amerada Hess, it is interesting to note the arguments used
by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in its decision. The
116. See id.at 257.
117. Id. Finally, the Court held that international agreements entered into by
Argentina that did not explicitly mention waiver of immunity to suit or the availability of a
cause of action in the United States, did not fall under the existing agreement exception to
the FSIA. See id at 270 (citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 442-43).
118. See Bederman, supra note 4, at 257.
119. See id.
at 262-63.
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Second Circuit found that jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute
did in fact apply. 120 It reasoned that the FSIA focused only on
commercial concerns, thus leaving the door open to federal courts
to exercise jurisdiction over foreign states in suits alleging
violations of international law that fell outside the confines of the
12 1
FSIA.
In addition to creative jurisprudence by judges, plaintiffs have
also had to propound novel arguments. The first of these is
directed at the FSIA's section 1604. It asserts that if a foreign
sovereign violates international human rights norms (jus cogens
norms) contained in international treaties to which the United
States was a party in 1976, it falls within section 1604.122
A second argument is that those violations act as an express
waiver, and are, therefore, covered by the exception in section
1605(a)(1). 123 As seen above, the Supreme Court dealt with both
of these in Amerada Hess by saying a foreign nation does not
waive its sovereign immunity by signing an international
agreement unless that agreement explicitly mentions a waiver of
immunity and the availability of a cause of action in the United
125
States. 124 In yet another case, Siderman de Blake v. Argentina,
the Ninth Circuit set forth four criteria to determine if a foreign
sovereign waived its immunity under section 1604.126 It was clear
127
that no generic human rights treaty would meet this test.
A third strategy was to argue that a foreign country's
violation of international human rights norms was an implied
waiver of sovereign immunity under section 1605(a)(1). 128 This
was also raised in Siderman, where the plaintiffs argued that
"[i]nternational law does not recognize an act that violates jus
cogens as a sovereign act. A state's violation of the jus cogens
120. See Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir.
1987).
121. Dorsey, supra note 7, at 298.
122. See id at 270.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 270 (citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 442-43).
125. See Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
126. Those four criteria are that the agreement (1) must have been in.
force before
1976 (the adoption of FSIA); (2) must be an international agreement enforceable between
the United States and other foreign states or international organizations; (3) have selfexecuting provisions; and (4) expressly conflict with the immunity provisions of the FSIA.
See Bederman, supra note 4, at 271-72.
127. See idat 272.
128. See id.
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norm prohibiting official torture therefore would not be entitled to
the immunity afforded by international law." 129 In other words,
cloak of immunity falls away,
when a state violates jus cogens, the
130
suit.
to
amenable
state
the
leaving
This jus cogens argument, to imply a waiver of sovereign
immunity for humans rights abuses, however, did not convince the
court in Siderman, which cited Amerada Hess as having decided
approach was given the
the issue. 131 In Princz too, this 132
above.
mentioned
burial"
"ignominious
In summary, these contortions demonstrate that in order to
attempt to fit a case under one of the FSIA's enumerated
exceptions, claimants bringing suit, and the courts ruling for them,
had to resort to considerable legal fictions and machinations of law
to prevail.
Perhaps the biggest stretch was petitioner's final argument in
Amerada Hess which asserted that the attack, while 5000 miles
away from the closest shore of the United States, had "by statutory
definition" occurred in the United States (to fit under the
exception in section 1603(c), i.e., within the territory of the United
States.).133
V. PROPOSED EXTENSION OF FSIA TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

A. No Jurisdiction Currently Exits over Human Rights Abuses
Committed by Foreign Governments
This twisted path that courts and litigants have had to
negotiate results simply from the lack of jurisdiction over human
rights abuses by foreign governments (or in the case of the TVPA,
very limited jurisdiction). These litigation strategies and judicial
contortions are shaky at best, and are certainly not guaranteed to
be successful in the future. The Princz case, where plaintiffs
prevailed at the district court level only to be defeated at the
appellate level, is but one example of the inadequacies of those ad
hoc litigation strategies.

129. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 718.
130. See id.
131. See Bederman, supra note 4, at 272.
132. See id at 273.
133. The Court stated, "[wie find this logic unpersuasive."
Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. 428,440 (1989).
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This is a real problem. It could be solved, however, by simply
creating jurisdiction over the human rights abuses of foreign
governments in U.S. courts.
B. ProposedAmendment to the FSIA
This Comment argues that a new exception to immunity for
human rights abuses should and could be fashioned. There would
be nothing magical about its formulation, and it could roughly
parallel the recently passed anti-terrorism exception to the
FSIA. 134 The exception would outlaw the most egregious forms of
human rights abuses and extend jurisdiction, of the kind extended
by ATCA, over foreign states for such human rights abuses. It
would provide a way out of the quandary created by Amerada
Hess, which (by holding the FSIA is the sole means of obtaining
jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns) precludes such jurisdiction
under the Alien Tort Statute. Such an amendment would also
provide for a Congressional gate-keeping function, similar to the
one in the Anti-Terrorism Act, to control its applicability to a
135
designated set of countries.
VI. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR A HUMAN RIGHTS
EXCEPTION

It must be remembered that in Amerada Hess the Court
stated there was no enumerated exception to the FSIA that
covered the facts of that case. This decision strongly implies that
the Court, in finding that no exception applied, presumably meant
that were there such an exception, then the foreign sovereign
could be reached. This again points to the necessity of a
statutorily-defined basis (in the form of a narrowly drawn human
rights abuses exception) on which the Court could rely.
The issue presented by such an exception is two-fold. First,
could Congress pass such a law? Second, would the courts uphold

134. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (1997).
135. It is not necessary to specify here what those abuses would be or which countries
would be targeted. That would be left to the political process. The outer bounds of the
amendment would, no doubt, turn on political considerations bearing on such an
amendment's chances of passing in Congress. Once enacted and successfully litigated, the
usual issues of obtaining judgment and the collection of any award would still attach. See
e.g., Allison J. Flom, Note, Human Rights Litigation Under the Alien Tort Statute: Is the
Forti v. Suarez-Mason Decision the Last of Its Kind?, 10 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 321,
323,354 (discussing Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1537 (N.D. Cal. 1987)).
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136
and enforce such a provision?

A. CongressionalJustification
1. The Principles Underlying Sovereign Immunity
As discussed above, the basic principles underlying sovereign
immunity are international comity and reciprocity. Analogous to
the doctrine of "unclean hands" in courts of equity, a country
could hardly claim the defense of comity when being haled into
The
court for the mass murder of thousands of people.
responsible world community wholeheartedly condemns such
abuses; there would be no question among reasonable people as to
the legitimacy of an amendment covering such abuses. With a new
amendment covering human rights abuses the FSIA's underlying
principle of comity would still be intact. The only parties that
would complain would be the offending governments
137
themselves.
The concern about reciprocity is similar. The countries which
would be affected are those with which we already have difficulty
or with which we lack diplomatic relations. These countries are
likely to be the same ones targeted by the 1996 anti-terrorism
138
amendment.
. As outlined above, with regard to any other countries that
might be affected, a proposed human rights amendment, like the
1996 anti-terrorism amendment to the FSIA, would have two
facets: (1) a remedies component and (2) a gate-keeping function.
Congress would be able to designate a list of countries to which
the amendment would apply. Countries such as China, which may
be politically difficult to include in the amendment, would not
have to be. But like the courts that have grappled with human
rights abuses in the past, the attempt here would not be the
creation of an ultimate, all-inclusive solution. Rather, it would be

136. It should be kept in mind that these questions are interrelated, such that
arguments for one can be arguments for the other.
137. And of course the more they complained, the more effective such an amendment
would be in achieving the policy goal of discouraging, and hopefully eliminating, human
rights abuses.
138. The seven countries on the list of state sponsors of terrorism are Cuba, Iran, Iraq,
Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. See Export Administration Act of 1979 § 6(j), 50
U.S.C. App. § 2405 (j) (1998), and Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 620A, 22 U.S.C. §
2371 (1998).
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but an evolutionary step to a broader jurisprudence. An old
Chinese proverb tells us a long journey begins with the first step.
A limited human rights exception amendment would be such a
step.
2. Precedent of the 1996 Anti-Terrorism Amendment to the FSIA
Perhaps the strongest argument for the new exception would
be legislative precedent. Congress recently passed an amendment
to the FSIA with respect to state-sponsored terrorism. 139 This is
an extremely crucial point because the issue involved is nearly
identical-and the remedies and even the affected part of the
statute would be exactly identical. (i.e., an amendment adding a
new exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)).
Until 1996, section 1605(a) of the FSIA codified six
exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity. The Anti-terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 amended section 1605(a) to
include acts of terrorism committed by foreign states designated as
state sponsors of terrorism.
That amendment to the FSIA followed the original drafting
pattern used in the FSIA and simply added an additional
exception to the original five exceptions. Nor was it the first
exception added to the original five. In 1988, actions to enforce
agreements to arbitrate and the resulting arbitration awards were
exempted from immunity. 14° And as discussed above, the AntiTerrorism Act of 1996 added the seventh category to the list of
141
exceptions.
These exceptions, therefore, are precedent for expanding the
list of exceptions in the first instance. Second, the latest antiterrorism exception is very closely related to human rights abuses,
and it would only be an incremental step to create a new exception
dealing with human rights abuses.
Moreover, there can be no doubt that Congress felt that the
anti-terrorism amendment enacted in 1996 was consistent with the
underlying principles of sovereign immunity.
Finally, it must be pointed out (tautological as it may seem)
that the "intent of Congress" was expressly embodied in the

139. Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
221, 110 Stat. 1214, 1241 (1996).
140. See 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(6) (1997).
141. See 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(7) (1997).
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decision to include the anti-terrorism amendment in the FSIA,
thus enabling it to satisfy the courts' oft-stated criteria of divining
Congressional intent when interpreting a statute. The same could
be said of any new human rights exception passed by Congress.
(The "intent of Congress" criteria has often blocked litigants when
courts felt a claimant extended the interpretation
of a statute
142
beyond the limits intended by Congress.)
B. JudicialAcceptance and Enforcement
The -above discussion demonstrates that Congress would be
justified in passing such an amendment. Because an exception
could easily be created with the requisite legislative will, this
section addresses the second part of the two-fold issue introduced
above. Would the Courts uphold and enforce such a law? The
answer is yes.
1. Judicial Willingness to Rule Against Human Rights Abuses
The hoops that courts have been willing to go through, and
the fictions they have been willing to entertain, demonstrate their
desire to play a role in remedying human rights abuses. The
constraints of case law, however, have often precluded the courts
from doing so. A statute specifically addressing human rights
abuses would provide the courts with a basis to rule for which they
are looking, and it would not be inconsistent with the holding in
Amerada Hess, in which the Court implied that if there was such a
statutory exception, it could be used. Courts have wanted to find a
way to rule for plaintiffs, but have repeatedly had to rule against
them. The discussion above shows that the courts are almost
inviting a response from Congress. 143
2. Judicial Recognition of Congressional Intent
Courts have shown a willingness to discern the intent of
Congress when passing on the meaning of a statute. In numerous
FSIA cases, courts have shown their desire and obligation to defer
to Congressional intent. While this principle was often expounded
in cases in which foreign sovereigns were allowed to escape
liability, the courts enunciated the principle nonetheless.

142. See infra Part VI.B.2.
143. See supra Part IV.B.
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Commenting on the possibility that individual state actors might
be made subject to suit, the Ninth Circuit in Chuidian stated:
[W]e cannot infer that Congress . . . intended to allow
unrestricted suits against individual foreign officials acting in
their official capacities. Such a result would amount to a
blanket abrogation of foreign sovereign immunity by allowing
litigants to accomplish indirectly what the Act barred them
from doing directly. It would be illogical to conclude that
Congress would have enacted such a sweeping alteration of
existing law implicitly and without comment. 14
In Amerada Hess, in debunking petitioner's argument that the
attack by definition had occurred within the United States, the
Court said, "[w]hen it desires to do so, Congress knows how 145
to
place the high seas within the jurisdictional reach of a statute."
Again, in Amerada Hess, the Court dissected the language of the
Act to seek Congress' intent. "Congress's decision to use explicit
language in § 1605(a)(2), and not to do so in § 1605(a)(5), indicates
that the exception in § 1605(a)(5) covers only torts occurring
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." 146 This
sort of hairsplitting by the Court to determine the intent of
Congress further indicates the willingness of the Court to follow
that intent.
This is shown again in the Court's analysis of section
1605(a)(3) in Amerada Hess. There, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the FSIA applied only to commercial
activities -leaving courts free to exercise jurisdiction over foreign
governments in suits alleging violations of international law falling
outside the "commercial" confines of the FSIA.
In rejecting the Second Circuit's argument that the FSIA only
applied to commercial concerns, the Supreme Court noted that the
FSIA's legislative history showed that Congress had indeed
explicitly considered violations of international law by foreign
states when it enacted the FSIA. 147 The Court held that "the text
and structure of the FSIA demonstrate Congress' intention that
the FSIA be the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign
144. Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 1990).
145. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. 428,440 (1989).
146. Id. at 441.
147. The Supreme Court cited section 1605(a)(3), which specifically denies foreign
states immunity for suits "in which rights in property taken in violation of international
law are in issue."
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state in our courts," 148
and therefore ATCA was not applicable to
governments.
foreign
Another example, again in the area of sovereign immunity, is
in Lafontant v. Aristide.149 The Lafontant court had to decide if
the former head of state of Haiti was entitled to immunity. There
the court looked to the legislative history of the Torture Victims
Protection Act (TVPA) which indicated it was the intent of
Congress that the TVPA not displace the common law principles
of the head-of-state immunity. It held that the exiled Haitian
150
president, Aristide, was entitled to head-of-state immunity.
151
In yet another example, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,
the court held that an implied cause of action could
not arise under
152
international law without congressionalapproval.
The key in each of these cases was the willingness of the
courts to find and adhere to the intent of Congress. How much
easier it would be for the courts in human rights cases if Congress
were to pass an amendment explicitly containing such an
exception. Having an explicit amendment would allow the courts
to avoid legal contortions and simply follow Congress' intent. It
would both obviate the Court's need to divine the intent of
Congress and would provide a direct basis on which to rule.
3. Congress is the Proper Forum to Make Policy in the Area
Closely related to the above argument is the idea that the
courts normally prefer to let Congress make major changes and
extensions to existing law. The courts themselves will make those
changes and extensions when they must, but the constraints of case
law can lead to unintended results that go clearly beyond the limits
originally intended by the legislation. When courts push the law
past its intended limits, the results are often inefficient, indirect,
and ineffective ways of dealing with problems. As the Supreme
Court has said, "[a]ll who observe the work of courts are familiar
with what Judge Cardozo described as 'the tendency of a principle

148. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 434, 438.
149. See Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y 1994).
150. See Bederman, supra note 4 at 280 (citing Lafontant, 844 F. Supp. at 131-32).
151. See Tel Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(per curiam).
152. See Alan Frederick Enslen, Comment, Filartiga's Offspring: The Second Circuit
significantly expands the Scope of The Alien Tort Claim Act with Its Decision in Kadic v.
Karadzic, 48 ALA. L. REV. 695,701-03 (1997).
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to expand itself to the limit of its logic.""' 153 The fictions
entertained by the court in Filartigaare a good example of this
overreaching. It is at that point that Congress has the proper
function to change the law. The Supreme Court has said:
More than a century ago we recognized that 'the great office of
statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they are
developed, and to adapt it to the changes of time and
circumstances.' . . . The human condition is one of constant

learning and evolution-both moral and practical. Legislatures
implement that new learning .... 154
The courts, when grappling with these issues, recognize this, and as
we have seen, seek Congressional guidance.
4. Prudential Considerations
Closely related to this argument is the prudential
consideration on the part of the Court to respect the legislative
and executive branches' actions in political areas. The Supreme
Court has held that certain government conduct should not be
ruled on by the federal courts, but rather left to these politically
accountable branches of government. 155 This is the Court's oftenunciated prudential "political question" doctrine. The Supreme
Court has frequently held that cases presenting issues involving the
conduct of foreign affairs pose such political questions, and has
thus taken a deferential approach in these areas. 156 The Court has
said:

153. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (J. Jackson dissenting).
Sometimes these extensions are inordinate. In Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880
(C.D. Cal. 1997), plaintiffs, unable to reach the government of Burma because of
sovereign immunity, brought a claim against Unocal, a joint-venture partner of the
Burmese government, under a joint-tortfeasor theory extension of the Alien Tort Claims
Act. Unocal is an unwitting victim in this sort of legal machination-and from the
plaintiff's perspective, such "novel" strategies are risky and fraught with uncertainty at
best. Clearly, this sort of case law based extension of a statute can go beyond the point
where it makes any sense. The Court in this case wants to reach the human rights abuses
of the Burmese government and is willing to chart a twisted course to get there. A more
straightforward way would be simply to sue the Burmese government directly. A new
statutory exception in the FSIA would allow this.
154. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1069 (1992)(Stevens J.,
dissenting).
155. See ERWIN CHERMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 142 (2d ed. 1994).
156. See id. at 154.
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The conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is
committed by the Constitution to the Executive and
Legislature - 'the political'- Departments of the Government,

and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of157
this
political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.
Thus, if Congress deliberately chose to step into the area of human
rights abuses, the Court would take a deferential approach under
this "political question" prudential doctrine.
5. Constitutional Mandate
Finally, and most importantly, are the Constitutional
provisions and principles governing this area of law.
The
immunity of a foreign government from suit in a U.S. court "is a
matter of grace and comity on the part of the United States, and
not a restriction imposed by the Constitution," thereby allowing
Congress to alter the law in that area. 158 Presumably, based on
their prior decisions, the courts would respect that.
In Amerada Hess, the Court said, "[w]e start from the settled
proposition that the subject-matter jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts is determined by Congress 'in the exact degrees and
character which to Congress may seem proper for the public
good."' 159 Thus, by its own words, in the very case in which it
closed the ATCA door to suits against sovereign nations, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that Congress may legislatively
define the limits of FSIA's purview.
And it is more than a presumption that the courts would
respect this. The Court held that:
[The] FSIA must be applied by the district courts in every
action against a foreign sovereign, since subject-matter
jurisdiction in any such action depends on the existence of one
of the specified
exceptions to the foreign sovereign
160
immunity.
The Court has thus stated that once Congress has defined that
jurisdiction, the courts would then have to abide by it. Finally, in
Amerada Hess the Court held that:

157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. (citing Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
Verlinden B.V.v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480,486 (1983).
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428,433 (1989).
Id. at 434-35.
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Congress also rested the FSIA in part on its power under Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 10, of the Constitution "[t]o define and punish Piracies
and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against
the Law of Nations." From Congress' decision to deny
immunity to foreign states in the class of cases just mentioned,
we draw the plain inference that immunity is granted in those
cases involving alleged violations of international
law that do
not come within one of the FSIA's exceptions. 161
Thus, if Congress were to create a new human rights abuses
exception, the courts would recognize that a sovereign would not
have immunity in those cases. The Court then reiterated this,
saying, "[hiaving determined the FSIA provides the sole basis for
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in federal court, we turn
to whether any of the exceptions enumerated in the Act apply
16 2
here."
So the Amerada Hess case, which was so devastating to the
cause of human rights in the ATCA realm, actually contained the
solution to the problem all along. Congress could pass, and the
courts would apply, a new sovereign immunity exception in the
area of human rights.
VII. CONCLUSION

The passage of a new exception to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act that would cover human rights abuses by foreign
nations would be welcomed by many. No longer would sovereign
immunity be matter-of-factly invoked to shield abusive regimes
from having to account for their human rights abuses. No longer
would existing laws have to be contorted and assembled in odd
combinations in the hope of obtaining theoretical jurisdiction over
those regimes. No longer would sympathetic courts have to
engage in manipulation, sleight of hand, and judicial fictions to fit
such abuses into our existing legal framework.
A new human rights exception would make a more sensible
and direct route available to litigants and the courts. The entire
jurisprudence in this area-currently spread out between the Alien
Tort Claims Act, the State Action Doctrine, the Torture Victims
Protection Act, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Actwould become more unified and more consistent. A hodgepodge

161. Id. at 436 (citation omitted)(emphasis added).
162. Id. at 439.
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would no longer have to be coalesced from all the disparate parts
to bring a successful action, and the chances for success would be
greatly increased.
We do not accept state-sponsored terrorism-we ought not
accept other egregious forms of human rights abuses. The way has
already been paved by the 1996 anti-terrorism amendment. A new
exception would simply be a further step down that path.
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